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Rivers in Practice: Clinicians’ Assessments




Since the Rivers v. Katz decision in
1986, clinicians in New York
State have been required to assess
patient decision-making capacity
before judicial review of petitions
to administer involuntary medica-
tion. The authors examined 42
capacity assessments made by
psychiatrists at a large state hospi-
tal in New York City. Although
the capacity assessments were often
incomplete and rarely addressed
the treatment decision, most clini-
cians judged patients as lacking
capacity to make treatment deci-
sions. The findings suggest that
psychiatrists may view capacity as-
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sessments as irrelevant because of
the manifestly grave nature of pa-
tients’ illnesses or may not dif-
f erentiate the capacity assessment
f rom the mental status examina-
tion. The capacity assessment may
nonetheless be a useful tool because
it encourages clinicians to discuss
the proposed treatment with pa-
tients and to present information
more effectively in court.
The growing emphasis on patients’
right to self-determination has ne-
suited in litigation in several states
that has changed the way clinicians
practice psychiatry ( 1). Even when
the exercise ofthis nightnesults in the
rejection of medical intervention
normally considered beneficial (2),
self-determination has been sup-
ported in recent court decisions that
provide for either administrative or
judicial review of petitions to in-
voluntarily medicate a patient. Ren-
nie v. Klein (3)gave final authority to
clinicians and administrators. This
decision effectively granted patients
the night to a second opinion (1).
Rogers v. Commissioner (4) and Rivers
v. Katz (5) were more protective of
an actual right to refuse treatment
because they emphasized capacity
and required judicial input into
determination ofthe right to refuse.
In Rivers, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that “in situations
where the State’s police power is not
implicated, and the patient refuses to
consent to the administration of anti-
psychotic drugs, there must be a
judicial determination of whether
the patient has the capacity to make a
reasoned decision with respect to
proposed treatment before the
drugs may be administered pursuant
to the State’s parens patriae power.”
Clinicians were then faced with how
to apply this decision. This paper ex-
amines how clinicians in a large state
hospital in New York assessed the
capacity ofpatients selected for judi-
cia! review for involuntary treatment
after the Rivers v. Katz decision.
Decision-making capacity
Capacity is the ability to reach a
treatment decision. It is sometimes
referred to as functional competen-
cy. Clinical evidence suggests that
despite alterations in thinking and
mood, psychiatric patients are not
automatically less capable than
others of making health care deci-
sions. For example, schizophrenic
inpatients did not differ substantially
from medical inpatients in their
knowledge oftheir medication (6,7).
In addition, hospitalized psychiatric
patients and medical patients
evaluated the risks and benefits of
proposed research projects in a
similar manner (8). Medical patients
fail to comply with treatment as
often as psychiatric patients, and
their reasons for doing so include
many irrational elements (9,10).
Furthermore, incapacity may relate
to factors other than psychiatric ill-
ness (1 1,12), including the nature of
the interactions between the patient
and the treatment system (9,10).
To assess capacity, it is essential to
focus on the specific cognitive abili-
ties the patient uses in the actual de-
cision-making situation and to
demonstrate how the patient’s
symptoms and behavioral disturban-
ces interfere with passing commonly
used tests ofcapacity. Authors in the
legal and psychiatric literature have
focused on five tests of capacity-
evidencing a choice, factual under-
1160 November 1989 Vol. 40 No. 11 Hospital and Community Psychiatry
standing, national reasoning, ap-
preciation of the nature of the situa-
iion, and reasonable outcome of
choice (1 3-1 8). The first four tests
have been proposed as a hierarchy
(16,18), with each level providing a
stricter definition of decision-
making capacity. Reasonable out-
come of choice is not part of the
hierarchy because it does not
depend on the patient’s reasoning
but on the evaluator’s judgment of
what a reasonable person would do.
The Rivers decision and sub-
sequent New York State Office of
Mental Health regulations require
each of two evaluating psychia-
trists-the treatingphysician and the
clinical director on designee-to in-
terview the patient for whom a court
order for involuntary treatment is
sought and to formally evaluate
capacity. While Rivers mandated as-
sessment of capacity, it did not
specify how capacity is to be as-
sessed. State hospital policy requires
psychiatrists to complete a psychiat-
nc summary, outline the proposed
course of treatment, complete a
capacity evaluation form, and certify
that the patient has received the
necessary information about the
proposed treatment. Judges are then
asked to determine whether the
patient lacks capacity and, if so,
whether the proposed treatment is
appropriate and in the patient’s best
interest. When both conditions are
met, judges grant approval of in-
voluntary treatment for periods
usually ranging from 30 days to six
months (19).
The capacity section of the ap-
plication for involuntary medication
assumes that patients who are refus-
ing voluntary treatment have passed
one standard-evidencing a choice.
The State Office ofMenta! Health
outlines three standards that should
be applied by clinicians in detenmin-
ing a patient’s capacity. They are fac-
tual understanding of the proposed
treatment and ofits risks, benefits,
and alternatives; rational use of in-
formation to reach a conclusion
about treatment; and appreciation of
the consequences ofrefusing treat-
ment, the ability to anticipate the fu-
ture and to cognitively and affective-
ly appreciate the impact refusing
treatment would have on the course
ofthe illness, ability to function, and
quality of life. In the state system,
standards are not applied hierarchi-
cally. Furthermore, the evaluator’s
judgment ofwhat a reasonable pen-
son would do was not included as a
standard because it is biased in favor
of the physician’s opinion that the
patient needs treatment.
We sought to determine whether
clinicians presented comprehensive
treatment information to patients
before assessing their capacity and to
identify which capacity standards cli-
nicians used most frequently and
which standards patients were
judged to have passed and failed. A
case example will be presented to ii-
lustrate how clinical and legal con-
cerns can both be served by using the
capacity assessment properly.
Methods
This study retrospectively examined
how clinicians evaluated capacity at a
large state hospital in New York
City for the one-year period imme-
diately after implementation of the
Rivers decision-August 8, 1986, to
August 7, 1987.
Data were obtained from forms
completed by clinicians, including
the capacity evaluation form and
checklist of information given to pa-
tients, from patients’ charts, and
from the New York State Office of
Mental Health computerized pa-
tient information system.
For the one-year period, 2 1 pa-
tients ( 1 percent of the total number
ofbeds) were judicially reviewed for
involuntary medication. Because
each patient was evaluated by two
clinicians, 42 capacity assessments
were reviewed.
A sole rater scored the capacity
assessments. For each standard, the
rater determined whether the capac-
ity standard was addressed and, if so,
whether the clinician focused specif-
ically on the patient’s capacity to
make a treatment decision, rather
than giving a description of the
patient’s general reasoning abilities
and dysfunctions. The rater also
judged whether the patient passed
or failed the standard.
Patients were considered capable
of factual understanding if they
demonstrated adequate comprehen-
sion ofthe purpose ofthe prescribed
medication and its potential effects.
On the standard addressing rational
use of information, patients were
judged to be capable if they dis-
played relevant reasoning with
respect to the treatment decision.
Patients who acknowledged their
mental illness and the potential ef-
fects of their treatment decision on
their mental health were considered
capable on the third standard, ap-
preciation of the consequences of
refusing treatment.
Results
The patients in the sample were rep-
resentative of the hospital popula-
tion. Of the 2 1 patients who ap-
peared in court, four were women,
1 7 were men, 1 3 were black, four
were Hispanic, three were white,
and one was Asian. Fourteen of the
patients had at least a high school
diploma. At the time of the court
proceedings, 14 patients had clinical
chant diagnoses of schizophrenia,
four had schizoaffective disorder,
two had organic brain syndrome, and
one had affective disorder.
The mean ± SD age ofthe women
was 58 ± 1 3.9, and of the men,
39 ± 12.5. Females were somewhat
underrepresented relative to the
total hospital population, but the age
skew was consistent. The mean ± SD
number ofprevious psychiatric hos-
pitalizations was 6.4 ± 6.2. Patients
had been in the hospital for a mean
± SD of 1 1 ± 20.6 months at the
time ofthe first evaluation for invol-
untary treatment. The mean ± SD
time from the first evaluation to the
court decision was 5.8 ± 2.3 weeks.
Treatment explained to pa-
tients. A majority of clinicians re-
ported explaining all treatment-ne-
lated issues to patients. Thirty-nine
of the 42 evaluators stated that they
explained the patient’s condition,
the proposed treatment, the an-
ticipated benefits of treatment, and
the risk of adverse effects of treat-
ment. Thirty-five clinicians reported
explaining the availability of other
treatments and comparing their
benefits and risks with those of the
proposed treatment.
Table 1












Did not address 34 81.0 1 1 26.2 6 14.3
Could not evaluate 3 7.1 4 9.5 0 0.0
General comments 2 4.8 26 61.9 33 78.6
Treatment-specific
comments 3 7. 1 1 2.4 3 7.1
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Standards ofcapacity. Only five
assessments were performed using
all three standards, 23 were made
using two standards, and 14 using
one standard. Factual understanding
was addressed by eight evaluators,
rational use of information by 3 1,
and appreciation of the consequen-
ces ofnefusing treatment by 36.
None of the 42 evaluators as-
sessed only factual understanding,
three assessed only rational use of in-
formation, and 1 1 assessed only ap-
preciation. The most frequently ap-
plied combination of standards was
national use and appreciation, which
were used together by 20 clinicians.
Evaluations. A mean ± SD of
1.8±.1 clinician comments per
patient were about general patient
dysfunction, while only . 14 ± . 5 per
patient were specific to treatment.
As Table 1 shows, the rest of clini-
cians’ comments expressed their in-
ability to make adequate evaluations
ofcertain standards because patients
were uncooperative with the inter-
view. Seven of the 1 26 possible as-
sessments were specific to treat-
ment. The clinicians who made treat-
ment-specific evaluations addressed
all three standards of capacity.
The 42 evaluators gave patients
passing marks on only three assess-
ments-two on factual under-
standing and one on rational use of
information. Five patients failed on
one standard, 14 failed on two stan-
dards, and two failed on all three
standards.
Case example
The following case exemplifies a
complete and treatment-specific
capacity evaluation.
Mn. 5, a 41-year-old black male,
had four prior psychiatric admis-
sions. He was committed due to
auditory command hallucinations to
kill others. At the time of the initial
evaluation for involuntary treat-
ment, he had been in the hospital for
four and a halfmonths, and his diag-
nosis was chronic paranoid schizo-
phnenia. He was at that time de-
scnibed as belligerent, hostile and
potentially violent, combative, and
threatening to staff and other pa-
tients. On at least one occasion, he
was placed in seclusion. His ne-
ported symptoms were thought dis-
order and command hallucinations.
His speech, which was pressured at
times, was tangential with neo-
logisms. He had abused cocaine and
marijuana. His primary objection to
medication concerned the adverse
side effects he anticipated.
The clinician’s assessment. The
following statements are verbatim
accounts from the clinician’s report.
The phrases in quotes are statements
by the patient that were included in
the clinician’s report to substantiate
the assessment.
Factual understanding ofthe pro-
posed treatment. Mn. S is aware that
neuroleptics act on the nervous sys-
tern and that they “affect the brain”
and may cause adverse effects such
as “impotence and low blood pres-
sure.”
Rational use ofinformation. The
patient fears adverse effects of the
medication and is skeptical of any
benefits it may offer.
Appreciation of the consequences of
refusing treatment. The patient has
poor insight into his illness. He does
not appreciate his deterioration over
the past weeks with regard to his
withdrawn, hostile, and violent be-
havion. He believes he is functioning
as he always has without medication
and that he can exercise self-restraint
to prevent future violent behavior.
He is not aware of his thought dison-
den and denies any emotional dif-
ficulties associated with it. He ap-
pears not to understand the difficulty
he will have leaving a locked ward if
he continues to refuse treatment.
The rater’s conclusion. Mn. S,
the only patient judged to have
passed any capacity standard, passed
two of the three standards-factual
understanding and rational use of in-
formation-but failed the third stan-
dard because he was incapable of ap-
preciating the consequences of
refusing treatment. The clinician
made treatment-specific comments
to substantiate his opinion on all
three standards.
Discussion
In this small sample, a majority of cli-
nicians reported presenting compre-
hensive treatment information to pa-
tients undergoing review for in-
voluntary treatment. However, the
clinicians appeared to have difficulty
applying capacity standards. Al-
though too few capacity standards
were used and the clinicians’ corn-
ments were too generalized, most
clinicians concluded that patients
lacked the capacity to reach a treat-
ment decision.
The few clinicians who attempted
to assess the patients’ factual under-
standing often found that patients
refused to be interviewed. This find-
ing is consistent with previous find-
ings ofgneaten hostility among pa-
tients who refuse psychiatric treat-
ment (20).
There are other possible explana-
tions for clinicians’ neglect ofthe fac-
tual understanding assessment. Phy-
sicians may not value the patient’s
role in decision-making and ignore
the patient’s grasp ofthe facts. Some
patients may not be able to convey
adequate information (21). How-
ever, since some findings of ade-
quate capacity at the level of factual
understanding were observed, fail-
ing to assess patients on this standard
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may cause clinicians to underes-
timate capacity. The failure to ad-
dress factual understanding may also
indicate that clinicians used the men-
tal status exam to assess capacity
without having a discussion focused
on the patient’s understanding of the
treatment.
Clinicians assessed national use of
information and appreciation most
often, perhaps because they were
the most meaningful on under-
standable of the capacity standards.
Whatever the rationale for em-
phasizing these standards, a majority
of clinicians implicitly held patients
to the strictest tests of capacity.
Judges reinforced this practice,
upholding the refusal ofonly one of
the 2 1 patients (19).
Although clinicians were directed
to use all three standards in evaluat-
ing capacity, only 12 percent did so.
The clinicians who used all three
standards also made at least one
treatment-specific comment. This
finding suggests that clinicians who
have a better grasp of the tasks in-
volved in the evaluation of capacity
perform more complete assess-
ments.
The tendency among clinicians to
make only general comments and ig-
none the narrower question of
whether the patient has the capacity
to reach a treatment decision sug-
gests that clinicians simply transfer
information from the mental status
examination to the capacity assess-
ment. General statements such as,
“patient is grossly psychotic,” “pa-
tient has a profound thought disor-
den,” “patient has poor insight and
judgment,” and “patient believes his
food is poisoned” do not by them-
selves constitute statements about
the patient’s capacity to make a treat-
ment decision.
What clinicians reported may not
adequately reflect their interactions
with patients. Nevertheless, only 6
percent ofall evaluations concerned
the patient’s reasoning about the
proposed treatment. This finding
supports the observation that psy-
chiatnists tend to assume there is a
directly inverse relationship be-
tween the degree of psychopatholo-
gy and the patient’s capacity, even
though empirical findings do not
support this belief(18,22). Thus cli-
nicians’ focus may not appreciably
shift to the assessment of capacity.
The lack of completeness and
specificity of the capacity assess-
ments suggests that psychiatrists
may misunderstand the concept of
capacity or consider it irrelevant be-
cause the patients selected are
severely and chronically ill. Clini-
cians may fear prejudicing the judi-
cia! decision against treatment.
While this study took place in a state
hospital, the same tendency to ig-
nore patient capacity has been noted
in a variety of other inpatient and
outpatient settings (23).
Furthermore, some authors sug-
gest that judges, like psychiatrists,
appear to be more focused on the
need for treatment than on the
patient’s decision-making capacity
(24). Yet the capacity assessment is a
more useful tool than the mental
status examination for addressing
the problem oftreatment refusal. As
Brooks (1) notes, the value of em-
phasizing patient self-determination
is largely heuristic. The capacity as-
sessment explores the patient’s own
understanding and motivations re-
garding treatment, encourages psy-
chiatnists to communicate more ef-
fectively with patients, provides
physicians presenting their treat-
ment opinions in court with a set of
criteria recognizable to judges, and
offers a theoretically sound perspec-
tive on the host of clinical and legal
issues involved in treatment refusal.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported in part by
grantsMH4l734 and MH41735 to Dr.
Stanley from the National Institute of
Mental Health.
References
1. Brooks AD: The right to refuse antipsy-
chotic medications: law and policy. Rut-
gers Law Review 39: 339-376, 1987
2. Sadoff RI: Patient rights versus patient
needs: who decides? Clinical Psychiatry
44:27-32, 1983
3. RennievKlein, 720 F2d 266(1983)
4. Rogers v Commissioner, 390 Mass NE
2d 308(1983)
5. Rivers v Katz, 67 NY 2d 485 (1986)
6. Soskis DA: Schizophrenic and medical
inpatients as informed drug consumers.
Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry 35: 645-
647, 1978
7. Soskis DA, Jaffe RI: Communicating
with patients about antipsychotic drugs.
Comprehensive Psychiatry 20:126-131,
1979
8. Stanley B, Stanley M, Lautin A, et al:
Preliminary findings on psychiatric pa-
tients as research participants: a popula-
tion at risk? AmericanJournal of Psychi-
atry 138:669-671, 1981
9. Zisook 5, Gammon E: Medical noncom-
pliance. International Journal of Psychi-
atryinMedicine 10:291-303, 1981
10. Conrad P: The meaning of medications:
another look at compliance. Social
Science and Medicine 20:29-37, 1985
1 1. Amarasingham LR: Social and cultural
perspectives on medication refusal.
American Journal of Psychiatry 137:
353-358, 1980
12. Stanley B: Seniledementiaand informed
consent. Behavioral Sciences and theLaw
1:57-71, 1983
13. Sullivan TM: The involuntarily confined
mental patient and informed consent to
psychiatric treatment. Loyola University
LawJournal 5: 578-609, 1974
14. Friedman P: Legal regulation of applied
behavior analysis in mental institutions
and prisons. ArizonaLaw Review 17:39-
104, 1975
15. Roth LH, Meisel A, Lidz CW: Tests of
competency to consent to treatment.
American Journal of Psychiatry 134:
279-284, 1977
16. Appelbaum PS, Roth LH: Competency
to consent to research: a psychiatric over-
view. Archives of General Psychiatry
39:951-958, 1982
17. Stanley B, Stanley M:Testingcompeten-
cy in psychiatric patients: Whatisit? How
is it assessed? IRB: A Review of Human
Subjects Research 4:1-6, 1982
18. Stanley B: Informed consent in treat-
ment and research, in Handbook of
Forensic Psychology. Edited by Weiner
I, Hess A. New York, Wiley, 1987
19. Cournos F, McKinnon K, Adams C: A
comparison ofcinicaland judicial proce-
dures for reviewing requests for involun-
tary medication in New York. Hospital
andCommunity Psychiatry 39:851-855,
1988
20. Marder SR, Mebane A, Chien CP, et al:
A comparison ofpatients who refuse and
consent to neuroleptic treatment. Amer-
icanJournal ofPsychiatry 140: 470-473,
1983
2 1. BeckJC, Staffin 1W: Patient’s competen-
cy to give informed consent to medica-
tion. Hospital and Community Psychia-
try 37:400-402, 1986
22. Stanley B,Stanley M:Psychiatricpatients
and research: protecting their autonomy.
Comprehensive Psychiatry 138:669-
671, 1981
23. Lidz CW, Meisel A, Zerubavel E, et al:
Informed Consent. NewYork, Guilford,
1984
24. Appelbaum PS:The rightto refuse treat-
ment with antipsychotic medications:
retrospect and prospect. AmericanJour-
nalofPsychiatry 145:413-419, 1988
